Page 57 - AEI Insights Vol. 7 2021

Bajrektarevic, 2021

changer. China’s home is Asia. Its size and its centrality along with its impressive output is
constraining it enough.

Conclusively, it is not only a new, non-imitative, turn of socioeconomics and technology what
is needed. Without truly and sincerely embracing mechanisms such as the NAM, ASEAN and
SAARC (eventually even the OSCE) and the main champions of multilateralism in Asia, those
being India Indonesia and Japan first of all, China has no future of what is planetary awaited –
10
the third force, a game-changer, discursive power, lasting visionary and trusted global leader.
If there was ever in history a lasting triumph, this is over by now. In the multipolar world of
XXI century dominated by multifaceted challenges and multidimensional rivalries, there is no
conventional victory. Revolution or restauration?

Post Scriptum:
To varying degrees, but all throughout a premodern and modern history, nearly every world’s
major foreign policy originator was dependent (and still depends) on what happens in, and to,
Russia. So, neither a structure, nor content or overall direction of world affairs for the past 300
years has been done without Russia. It is not only a size, but also a centrality of Russia that
matters. That is important as much (if not even more), as it is an omnipresence of the US or a
hyperproduction of the PR China. Ergo, that is an uninterrupted flow of manufactured goods
to the whole world, it is a balancing of the oversized and centrally positioned one, and it is the
ability to controllably corrode the way in and insert itself of the peripheral one. The oscillatory
interplay of these three is what characterizes our days.

Therefore, reducing the world affairs to the constellation of only two super-players – China
and the US is inadequate – to say least. It is usually done while superficially measuring Russia’s
overall standing by merely checking its current GDP, and comparing its volume and PPP, and
finding it e.g. equal to one of Italy. Through such ‘quick-fix’, Russia is automatically
downgraded to a second-rank power status. This practice is as dangerous as it is highly
misleading. Still, that ill-conceived argument is one of the most favored narratives which
authors in the West are tirelessly peddling. What many analysts miss to understand, is in fact
plain to see; throughout the entire history of Russia: For such a big country the only way to
survive – irrespectively from its relative weaknesses by many ‘economic’ parameters – is to
always make an extra effort and remain great power.

To this end, let us quickly contrast the above narrative with some key facts: Russia holds the
key positions in the UN and its Agencies as one of its founding members (including the Security
Council veto right as one of the P5); it has a highly skilled and mobilized population; its society

10 Over the past few months, People’s Republic has upped the ante in nearly all of its many territorial disputes and
even provoked new ones, in another departure from past practice. Beijing has also reversed course when it comes
to its national periphery. “Past Chinese leaders, notably Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, believed in the
institutionalized processes of collective leadership. Xi has disabled or neutralized many of these channels. The
world may now be getting a sense of what China’s decision-making looks like when a singularly strong leader
acts more or less on his own” - noted professor Rapp-Hooper recently in her book. That of course triggers constant
shockwaves all over Asia. While Indonesia is contemplating the NAM’s reload as well as the ASEAN block
strengthening, others are reactive. India and Japan, two other Asian heavyweights (and champions of
multilateralism), are lately pushed to sign up on the so-called Indo-Pacific maritime strategy with the United States
(balancing the recent Pacific trade deal of RCEP). However, none of these three has any coherent plan on what to
do on the Asian mainland. They all three differ on passions, drives and priorities. This is so since the truly pan-
continental organization is nonexistent in Asia.

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