Page 10 - ASEAN-EU Dialogue 2018: Regional and Inter-Regional Economic Cooperation: Identifying Priorities for ASEAN and the EU

procedures and delays due to export inspection combined with high fees and charges for the
waiting time, arbitrary behaviour by officials (in terms of informal payments for the issuance
of certification for heat treatment and classification and valuation of the product) and the
requirement for a large number of different/redundant documents are cited as additional
obstacles to comply with technical requirements (including conformity assessment procedures)
for food and agro-based products in the Indonesian case (ITC, 2016a).

Apart from redundancies in obtaining certifications for public health and environment safety,
procedural obstacles, in the form of technical compliance, are also cited as a major issue in the
Philippines (Medalla and Mantaring, 2017). Specific problems for exporters relate to
inadequate product testing (lighting, electromagnetic compatibility and interference) facilities,
high costs of fumigation to obtain SPS certificates for agro products and pallets for automotive,
and discrepancies in export procedure policies between Customs or port authorities and in the
provinces causing delays, additional informal payment and more paperwork (see also
UNCTAD, 2009). From the import perspective, abuse in the form of informal payments is
rampant in order to obtain the license for regulated chemical imports (ITC, 2017). Importers
attribute such discriminatory behaviour of government officials favouring local suppliers. The
procedural obstacles identified in the Philippines are also found to be common in Thailand
(ITC, 2016b).

For the newer AMS, the procedural obstacles are even more serious due to capacity constraints
and lack of information. For example, in Cambodia, the SPS legislation is still weak (ITC,
2014). The lack of accredited laboratories for testing and certification remain a critical issue,
affecting not just exports but also imports of food, cosmetics and drugs. Some medicine
samples have therefore been sent abroad for testing and certification. Cambodia is also saddled
with other barriers such as multiple and duplicate documentation, long processing times,
problems with classification and valuation of imported products and corruption.

Finally, the protectionist intent of NTMs can also be grasped through the stringency of national-
level regulations in comparison to globally accepted standards such as the Codex Alimentarius.
There are reasons to believe, in the case of nutrition labelling (though not mandatory in all
AMS), some countries in ASEAN have gone ahead to make the measure more restrictive than
the legitimate goal of providing information to consumers (Devadason and Govindaraju, 2018).
The reason for this divergence is the unique national (rather than regional or international)
standards. Given the complexity of the nutrition labelling regulations, there are concerns that
it is turning out to be a non-tariff barriers (NTB).

Further action is therefore needed to tease out the concealed objectives (if any) and
discriminatory application in those NTMs and subsequently correct the use of NTMs in the
individual AMS. In this regard, it should be recognized that NTMs are not a pure trade policy
2
instrument (Ing and Cadot, 2016). Thus, it should not be viewed as a trade negotiating issue ;
instead, it should be reviewed at the country-level. At the national level, unnecessary
(restrictive and obsolete) NTMs/ NTBs and domestic procedural obstacles should be removed,
and complex regulations simplified. The decision to remove NTMs should be confined to those
measures that are used to favour some economic agents over society, while the reform process
should be for those that serve a dual purpose of policy objectives and protectionism and those

2 Reciprocity in the streamlining of NTMs does not make sense (WTO, 2012). There is little bargaining space for
NTMs, that is, NTMs cannot be reduced or negotiated down like tariffs.
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