Page 87 - AEI Insights 2018 Vol 4 Issue 1

Bajrektarević et al, 2018

construction of the Pelješac Bridge should be permanently solved by settling the so-called
previous issues elaborated earlier - the permanent maritime delimitation on the Adriatic Sea as
well as the permanent determination of the land border through a bilateral international frontier
treaty, which will be applied equally and in good faith by both signatory parties and which will,
above all, be confirmed in both the Croatian Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 would
be applicable in the event of any dispute as to its application, and the interpretation of certain
provisions thereof. In addition to this, as mentioned above, it is necessary to establish in an
internationally appropriate manner the legal regime and the width of the future corridor, which
will represent, inter alia, a junction between Bosnian and Herzegovinian waters and the High
Seas of the Adriatic.

Hence, only after the final determination of all the aforementioned, and after a thorough,
concrete and legally binding determination of the legal regime of the corridor above which the
permanent bridge will be built, the scientific and professional processing of the project known
as the Pelješac Bridge must be approached. This should meet all the technical characteristics
of bridges that have already been built over water within the international legal regime, i.e.
international waterways, such as the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge and the Bosporus Bridge in
Istanbul that cross over the waters of the Bosporus strait which is under international legal
regime, or the Oresund bridge (although most of the international maritime traffic takes place
above the underwater tunnel) linking the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of Sweden
and which is also located over the international waterway. This means that if the agreement
between the two neighboring coastal states in this part of the Adriatic Sea could be achieved,
in the sense of completing its construction and opening it for all road traffic, the bridge of these
dimensions must have a certain minimum navigation height and a minimum range between the
pillars, or at least the central ones, so that big ships could also sail into the Neum waters.
Bosnia and Herzegovina somehow tend to always delay consideration of certain questions. If
this continues, there is a great chance that there will be no single institutional response, with
the result that the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to this important international
legal issue will remain very vague and indeterminate. Additionally, there is a very long internal
tradition which does not encourage political cooperation, and a lack of understanding of things
that are of fundamental significance to the whole country, not just to one of its constituent
peoples.

However, in expectation of any kind of determination on the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
with or without the Pelješac Bridge, the problem of the permanent "drawing" of the borderline
between the two countries, both on the sea and on the land, will remain. The question of the
access corridor or the connection of Bosnia-Herzegovina's waters with the High Seas will not
be sorted out alone. So, is it wise to wait for the international community or the Office of the
High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (if it is still here?!) to take steps to protect the
international interests of this state?

This is an opportunity to see the strength of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian diplomacy which will
once again demonstrate its position on the international stage. There is certainly a consistent
lack of unity, resulting predominately from the less than satisfactory territorial organization,
and attempts to build a state on the basis of ethnicity. This lack of unity is reflected in the
impossibility of coming to clear institutional views on the part of the official state government.
There may again be the emergence of a culture of conflict and non-cooperation at the
Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which could, adopt the declaration, as a
political act, with precisely defined conclusions), the Council of Ministers and the Presidency.

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