Page 36 - AEI Insights 2018 Vol 4 Issue 1

AEI Insights, Vol 4, Issue 1, 2018

matches the ‘common sense' of the world politics to feel insecure, because even big powers
like the US still feel threatened with outside interference. Thus, this maintains that ASEAN can
be principally pragmatic by nurturing a distinct way of conducting its internal and external
relations underpinning an informed identity construction (Acharya 2004).

Core assumptions relating to ASEAN principled-pragmatism

In the region of Southeast Asia, there is a local understanding that state sovereignty can only
be maintained by giving a particular emphasis on multilateral institution at the regional levels.
In this sense, the structure of ASEAN is designed to increase the salience of norms, in order to
respond to such conflict" (Alagappa 2003:77). The personification of this statement can be seen
in the form of the Association’s conventional practice underlying its normative security
strategy which are the concepts of ASEAN Way, neutrality, multilateralism and centrality. The
reason is that throughout its fifty years of operation, these are the locally accepted normative
behaviours that guide the ten member states' expectation on how ASEAN can reach certain
condition of ‘win-win’ in its political-security, economic and sociocultural framework
(Acharya 1998:67).

The consequence of having such normative principles embedded in its structure creates a sense
of pre-determined expectation within the countries, concerning to what extent one can signify
the regional desire that is to achieve an effective and lasting form of agreement. In this context,
it should be noted that by being principled pragmatic it does not mean ASEAN member-state
is being wholly ignorant of what is critical to regional stability. The idea is that principled-
pragmatism put forward a condition where the response to a particular problem is based on the
regional moral behaviour and realistic thinking regarding each party’s multidimensional
interests.

There are several key determinants relating to the extent of ASEAN principled-pragmatism
which are threat perception, regional resilience-ruled based focus and ‘we-feeling’ identity.
First, in Southeast Asia, the threat perception varies depending on three broad scopes of intra-
ASEAN, inter-ASEAN and the rulings elites. For some scholars, the threat perception in the
region can be associated to all three scopes, depending on “whose security is threatened and
the nature and gravity of the threat” (Emmerson 2009:5). For instance, there were incidents at
SCS where states seek to assert or defend its resource interests as seen in the case of Phú Khánh
basin between Vietnam and China and there was also the obscurity over maritime entitlement
of features in SCS hinders the states’ security interests such as in the case of China’s objection
over the Freedom of Navigation Program led by the United States.

In this particular point, it is important to identify ASEAN’s unique ability to response to
external threat through the systems of conflict management as pointed out by Mikio Oishi,
which are the mediation regime system (MRS) and the alliance system (AS). Oishi explains
mediation regime system functions to absorb tensions and shocks using the regional norms and
practices of multilateral diplomatic engagement in order to ensure nonaggressive actions taken
by the opposing parties, while through the alliance system, ASEAN seeks to control Beijing’s
involvement using balancing and deterrence against China and United States (Oishi 2017: 11),
Both systems can be considered as principled pragmatic in a way that ASEAN manages not
only to consolidate “the reciprocally conflicting positions of the parties but also to allow
dissipation of tension underlying the constitutive functions that open the possibility of better
management of the dispute” (Oishi 2016: 13-14). It is also should be noted that the ASEAN’s
ability to absorb and cope with shocks relating to Great Powers’ involvement in SCS can be

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