Page 38 - AEI Insights 2018 Vol 4 Issue 1

AEI Insights, Vol 4, Issue 1, 2018

When looking at the concept of principled-pragmatism in ASEAN and the European Union, it
gives several compelling indications in terms of how the both organisations are getting similar
in their approach relating to their political-security framework. First, the EU was previously
known of its conventional approach of ‘naming-and-shaming’, ‘sanctioning’ and demanding
convergence on its terms in order to implement the European-wide rules over the opposing
parties. There were internal severance over issues of Euro, refugees, migrants, terrorism,
environment and other transnational challenges. Even worse, the EU’s approach in
perpetuating the liberal international order has also unintentionally contributed to the
reinforcement of the regime relating to the case of Syria, Turkey and Russia as well as had
resulted in the deteriorating peace in the nearby neighbourhood, as seen in Egypt, Syria, Libya,
Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen.

In this context, the concept of principled pragmatism that is applied in the EU’s political-
security vision can be seen through its emphasis of ‘pragmatism philosophy’, of which the
Union realistically uses a broader lens to connect and understand the world, and not as how it
would like to see it. As explained by Tocci in ‘A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World’, the
notion of principal pragmatism helps the EU to distinguish what is acceptable to the Union’s
core values and principles by weighing the practical consequences of acts and a focus on local
practices and dynamics. The current example is how the EU is being principled pragmatic to
develop traction according to its values and interest with the other countries. For instance, in
the case of South China Sea legal dispute, the European Union had been careful to comment
on Beijing’s weak adherence in upholding international law despite the active Chinese
militarization of South China Sea islands.

According to the statement of all 28 EU governments after the arbitration, the bloc recognised
the court ruling in The Hague and the support on “committed to maintaining a legal order of
the seas and oceans. Rather than using affirmative languages such as support or welcome in
regards the tribunal’s decision, the EU decided to only recognise the Court’s ruling. The logical
reasons for the Union’s broad, general statement on the dispute are namely due to the extensive
Chinese investment in its own land, the intensified Beijing’s lobbying activity towards
individual governments of EU to neutralize the bloc’s involvement in the SCS dispute as well
as to maintain its neutral position and political interests with the United States and ASEAN
member states. In this context, the EU is being principled by identifying the significance of
international law in parallel to its longstanding values, yet is pragmatic in terms of
consolidating the 28 governments’ interests and the Union’s diplomatic advantage in relation
to China.

It relates to how ASEAN was criticized by the EU and the international community for being
politically blind when it officially accepted Myanmar into the regional grouping in 1997 despite
its human rights record. But, the role of ASEAN and its constructive engagement policy can
be seen imperative in democratising the regime’s commitment to reform in its political and
economic sectors, by contributing experiences and resources, and working with the people and
government of Myanmar (Renshaw 2013:37).

Second, ASEAN recognition of democratic principles and rules-based community in its
political-security agenda reflects the member-states' commitment to undertake greater
institutionalisation efforts so that ASEAN can retain its role as a driving force in regional
dialogue and cooperation. It is because the establishment of ASEAN Charter in 2007 and its
current morality-based approach underlying the legal principles such as the UNCLOS in SCS
has transformed itself from a loose grouping of sovereign nation states to an intergovernmental

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