Page 42 - AEI Insights 2018 Vol 4 Issue 1

AEI Insights, Vol 4, Issue 1, 2018

Next, the second level of being principled and pragmatism in the South China Sea conflict is
the ‘Low cost-Low benefit' in which these countries do not take any confrontation that requires
military offence but rather cautious in addressing the dispute via public statements. Contrary
to the first example, the second group usually partakes a hedging strategy in response to the
China's assertiveness in the SCS by focusing on getting return-maximising in terms economic
pragmatism and preparing for risk-contingency through indirect-balancing or forging defence
cooperation with other countries (Kuik 2016: 507).The countries might cajole Beijing for
economic assistance, but prepare the military for the worst. With this expectation, the member
states are trying to minimise or lower China’s hegemonic benefit in SCS dispute.

The countries that might fit in this description are either claimant or non-claimant states like
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Brunei. These countries also hold strategic
geopolitical interests in the South China Sea such as its freedom of navigation and natural
energy, which is why the maintenance of maritime stability is more important. The article will
specifically look at the example of Malaysia's principled-pragmatism approach in SCS dispute
underlying the ‘Low cost-Low benefit' expectation. Predominantly, there have been two
dominant narratives in Putrajaya in its response to SCS dispute. The first discourse is that
Malaysia has been seen as "playing it safe" through its neutral and independent posture and
strategic diversification foreign policy to ensure its claim in SCS (Parameswaran 2015:6).
Specifically in this view, the conflict in South China Sea is seen as an ASEAN’s problem that
requires diplomacy and restraint as it is not simply a matter of Malaysia’s sovereignty.

The second overture involves a stronger mode of opposition through its public statement and
even directly to the Chinese ambassador in response to foreign ships incursion in Malaysia’s
lawful water in SCS, to which the country would take legal action if its sovereignty is being
threatened (Hellendorff 2016: 292). It is because there were increasing intrusions by the
Chinese PLAN vessels since 2013 around James Shoal and other areas within Malaysia's EEZ.
The article views the grand narratives of Malaysian foreign policy in SCS dispute as principled
pragmatic in two ways. First, Malaysia makes certain that it will always favour positive
economic relationship but at the same, places its national sovereignty at the top of its foreign
policy. The underlying message is that Malaysia is aware that China presents more of an
opportunity than a threat to its interests and it would be counter-productive to strain the deep
bilateral ties simply due to the SCS dispute. Second, Malaysia took a cautious step to balance
the rhetoric in SCS dispute as it is wary over internationalising the issue in other platforms than
are not ASEAN as it might draw greater major power rivalry in the region (Hellendorff 2016:
293, Kuik 2013:456). It is because even without it having to move aggressively, it has a ‘loud'
neighbours like the Philippines and Vietnam that have been a useful buffer to project the
regional dissatisfaction to Beijing.

The last example of the member-state principled-pragmatism in SCS underscores the ‘High
cost-Low benefit' expectation. The countries that expect high cost-low benefit from the SCS
conflict would pursue a combination of direct-indirect engagement and balance towards China.
The countries would position themselves as the weaker states in the power disparity setting, in
the interest of defending their national interests and preserving regional stability. The
operationalisation of high cost-low benefit also means that these countries might spend on soft
balancing such as bringing up SCS issue in multilateral forums and hard balancing for a
deterrent purpose by increasing defence spending and strengthening law enforcement to deter
China's hegemonic control.

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