Page 39 - AEI Insights 2018 Vol 4 Issue 1

Azman and Kumar, 2018

organisation with a legal identity. Indeed, without preparing to incorporate rules and identity
in its formal framework, ASEAN will be merely based on geographic proximity.

But it also should be noted that although the Western idea of legality and institutionalism are
well-acknowledged in the region, it might not be to the extent of the EU's practise of
supranational authority which requires the shifting of decision-making from the national capital
to a regional bureaucracy. The reason is because the particular move is highly relevant to better
understand the extent of ASEAN principled-pragmatism as it strikes a balance between
preserving member-states' fundamentals due to “the high sensitivity and states and private non-
state actors reluctance to make hard obligations" (Deinla 2017:38). In this sense, although the
operationalisation of principled-pragmatism in both groupings might be different due to core
factors like institutional frameworks and capacity, the regional objectives and guiding norms,
it would be safe to assume that the notion of principled-pragmatism is likely to be desirable
and imperative as an instrument to guide their decision-making.

ASEAN principled-pragmatism in the South China Sea

The article would suggests that the current level of ASEAN principled-pragmatism approach
in South China Sea conflict could be seen in the form of ASEAN member-state considering
solutions to be in the areas that are ‘low cost to them and high benefit to China'. It also focuses
on the practical modus vivendi between ASEAN countries such as through the joint
development area to reconcile the different maritime interests and prevent an overly
contentious situation.

One of the most fitting examples to illustrate the general implication of ASEAN’s principled-
pragmatism in South China Sea dispute would be the failure to issue a joint communiqué on
SCS during the 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Phnom Penh. A week after the
incident, ASEAN member states came out with “ASEAN's Six-Point Principles on the South
China Sea” as a result of the unceasing efforts of member states like Indonesia to repair the
damage (Thayer 2013:78).

There are two reasons to explain this observation. First, the response reflects the real setting of
ASEAN's acceptance of the regional vulnerability given its ‘low cost' approach, due to the large
gap of political, economic and socio-cultural integration in the Southeast Asia region (Ba
2016:50). Second, the particular disagreement gave institutional experience of ‘high benefit to
China’, when it allowed the greed of individual states to be placed over the regional interests.
It results in the marginalization of the “perceived role of ASEAN as a neutral entity to neither
serve the interests of Beijing or other dominant powers (Storey 2016:135).

In this sense, what was primed as ASEAN’s clashes or disunity by the Western media, should
be seen as the Association’s ability to be realistic in its low-cost approach because ASEAN did
not force or throw out a superficial joint-statement just to satisfy the public checklist and
allowing itself to stay in its long-term illusion of ‘security community’ (Chang 2016:341).
Rather, ASEAN principled-pragmatism shines as it chose to face the short-term crisis to seek
options whereby those differences can be made compatible and is based on the freedom of the
will of the countries involved.

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