Page 45 - AEI Insights 2018 Vol 4 Issue 1

Azman and Kumar, 2018

material factors in determining the approach. In this sense, ASEAN principled-pragmatism
sought to illuminate specific meanings of state sovereignty and regional shared norms like non-
use of force and how it might be incorporated to form the strategies of balancing, hedging or
bandwagon against China and other major powers. Not only did these elements are paramount
to yield distinctive meanings for each member-state in the pursuance of regional stability, but
also realistic to the level of power disparity in the Asia-Pacific region.

However, it is inexplicable to presume that the concept of principled-pragmatism has a direct
stabilising effect to the SCS dispute. It is because as the majority of ASEAN countries turn to
China for investment and consequently give ‘high benefit' through the enhanced positional
negotiation power, China is also capitalising the hegemonic freedom to be more assertive by
militarizing the seas and threatening other claimants sovereignty in SCS. In this context,
ASEAN principled-pragmatism might have worsening impact on SCS although none of the
countries would want to see military conflicts in the troubled water.

At the same time, there are also positive developments relating to the operationalisation of
principled-pragmatism in the South China Sea. First, despite the recurrent maritime incidents
in SCS, ASEAN countries do not view each other as a threat and often focus on the bigger
picture by focusing of modus vivendi to solve maritime issues. Second, ASEAN countries
look at alternative ways based on moral rationalism through legal actions and realistically
through low-cost measures to avoid provocation in SCS. One of the examples is by renaming
their EEZs according to the local reference such as Indonesia’s “North Natuna Sea”.
Correspondingly, this article suggests that by adhering the idea of principled-pragmatism, it
might encourage ASEAN countries to come forth with efficient approaches in SCS. It also
includes the fact ASEAN has never take sides on the merits of a certain claim, nor it is
attempting to resolve the disputes. Thus, it gives flexibility for the countries to ‘pick’ any
measures.

To this end, the article would offer several suggestions in the aspects of political, economic
and sociocultural underlying the concept of ASEAN principled-pragmatism in South China
Sea dispute. The concern here is to make certain that the Association will remain viable not
just when dealing with external powers but most importantly, to be more significant for the ten
member-countries prospective relations. First, concerning the political framework, the core
problems with ASEAN current security approach are the lack of institutional leadership and
limited material domain, making many nations increasingly leaning towards bigger power for
economic sustenance. In this context, ASEAN can consider an ‘ASEAN minus X’ decision-
making relating to the critical matters in SCS in cases like illegal territory trespassing. The
upside point is that it would give flexible rooms for claimants to take charge of the matter while
non-claimants able to opt-out, which can solve problems like victim-blaming and sweeping
issues under the rug just because one particular country decides to disagree. A more concrete
way for ASEAN to deal with SCS dispute would include using its diplomatic strength to open
up discussion and enhance cooperation with other major regions over the issues of maritime
security, territorial management and international law, which has been the centre of
commitment for most countries especially when it comes to safeguarding one’s sovereignty
against the huge influence of major powers like China. This way, ASEAN might be able to
stabilise its position in the region and to uncover new relationship that is based on rules-based
security order. It is also vital to do as to lessen Beijing’s control over ASEAN’s relationship
with external parties like the European Union, which might be cautious to cooperate with
ASEAN in SCS matters due to China’s dominating political and economic statecraft in the
region.

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