Page 48 - AEI Insights 2019 - Vol. 5, Issue 1
P. 48

AEI Insights, Vol 5, Issue 1, 2019


               The culmination of the accommodative policy towards Islam is remarked by the establishment
               of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI- Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim
               Indonesia), which is composed of diverse social and cultural forces (Fauzi, 1995; Uchrowi &
               Usman, 200). ICMI is different from other Islamic organizations and movements as it has been
               backed  up  by  various  Muslim  groups  such  as  government  bureaucrats  and  technocrats,
               moderate Muslims groups and non-government Muslim leaders (Schwarz, 2000).  However,
               this  association  has  been  severely  criticised  by  many  officers  in  the  military  as  well  as
               conservative Muslim scholars, such as those in the NU led by Abdurrahman Wahid (Ramage,
               1995; Schwarz, 2000).
               With the establishment of  ICMI, Modern Muslims have been given further opportunity to
               express Islamic voices. The Muslim newspaper Harian Republika, for instance, was given a
               license in 1992 due, undoubtedly, to the support of Suharto. On the other hand, the Monitor, a
               weekly tabloid owned by Catholic-Gramedia publishing group, which also publishes the well-
               read newspaper, Kompas, was closed down after it published the results of a readers’ poll of
               the most admired public figure. In the findings, Suharto was placed as the most popular public
               figure, while Prophet Muhammad SAW was voted as being in the eleventh place. This severely
               annoyed the Muslim community, which led to the government to cancel its license (Ramage,
               1995).

               As a Muslim organisation that was  looked upon as enjoying the president’s favour, many
               nominal Muslim bureaucrats and Golkar cadres joined ICMI, thus, the Islamisation that took
               place in the state and society. This was evident in the increased number of Muslim members
               of  Cabinet  and  high-ranking  military  officers  after  Suharto  was  re-elected  in  1993.  In  his
               cabinet, 99 percent of the 38 ministers were Muslims, as opposed to the earlier Cabinet which
               was composed of only 60 percent Muslims (Suryadinata, 1998).  Since 1993, furthermore,
               Suharto  had  deployed  other  think  tank  groups.  Previously  the  Centre  for  Strategic  and
               International Studies (CSIS) was known as the centre where input on the government decision-
               making, especially in the area of government political, control was studied (Anwar, 1999).
               After the establishment of ICMI, Suharto deployed another think tank made up of Muslim
               experts, the Center for Information and Development Studies (CIDES) (Anwar, 1999).
               Nevertheless, Habibie’s ICMI has successfully contributed to the building of Islamic awareness
               among the New Order government officers and the establishment of positive perception of
               Islam. Islam during the early New Order had been labelled as an extremist and radical when it
               was  associated  with  Darul  Islam  (DI).  As  such,  many  Muslims,  especially  among  the
               bureaucrats, were afraid of implementing Islam publicly. To some extent, they did not even
               want to be seen as practising Muslims (McVey, 1983, p. 200).
               But in the 1990s, Islam was finally given the opportunity to enjoy the good relationship and
               strong patronage of Suharto’s government. This patronage was perceived by non-Muslims and
               some nominal Muslims, especially from the NU, as the result of ‘sectarian Islam’- which is
               seen as seeking the establishment of an Islamic state (Schwarz, 2000).  This revivalism has, to
               some extent, contributed to the fall of Suharto. As Islamisation penetrated the government
               body,  many  groups  of  the  senior  non-Muslim  and  nominal  Muslim  army  officers  who
               supported Suharto during the early period of political consolidation were neglected, especially
               after the establishment of the ICMI. This analysis may partly explain why Suharto failed to
               maintain his power (Singh, 2001). At the demise of the Suharto government, some Muslim
               groups who defended Suharto expressed the belief that Suharto’s fall was due to a political
               conspiracy  of  Chinese-Catholic-Zionists  aimed  at  the  destruction  of  Islam  in  Indonesia
               (Hefner, 2000).





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