Page 57 - AEI Insights 2018 Vol 4 Issue 1
P. 57

Szanto, 2018



               significant popular resistance, especially if pursued without a popular vote. It merely wishes to
               renege on the obligations part of its membership.

               Essentially  the  authority  of  the  Hungarian  state  to  independently  determine  policy  is  not
               substantially threatened as it has clear options to defy policy directions it does not agree with.
               This goes beyond a reasonable interpretation of sovereignty. The problem is that Budapest is
               unsatisfied with the fact that it cannot do so without suffering the consequences of its actions.
               Once upon a time, before reality inconveniently started to rear its ugly head, BREXIT was
               heralded  as  Britain  having  its  cake  and  eating  it  too.  Budapest  desires  something  similar:
               Hungary wants to enjoy the benefits of international cooperation, benefits it feels entitled to,
               without accepting the costs of international cooperation, seeking to pick and choose whether
               to honour obligations based on political convenience. While such a desire is understandable,
               any form of acquiescence would create a dangerous precedent.


               The sovereignty to defy obligations: the end of the international legal order

               Law work differently on the domestic and international levels. In a domestic context laws are
               based on the disproportionate power of the state. In an international context a higher level of
               trust is involved as laws exists between sovereign agents in the absence of a higher enforcement
               power.  International  cooperation  is  based  on  states’  trust  that  they  will  each  honour  their
               obligations. Take the idea of collective security: one state trust another that it will provide aid
               in case of a conflict, but there is little tangible guarantee that the other state will do so. Naturally
               states also have a desire to renege on their obligations or conflicts otherwise arise from the
               interpretation  of  international  agreements.  Hence  states  create  various  institutions,  such  as
               international courts, to resolve such issues. But at its core, all of this is based on trust: states
               can choose to defy agreements and international courts as sovereign agents. Countries such as
               the United States (defying the U.S. vs Nicaragua ruling of the International Court of Justice)
               and the People’s Republic of China (defying the Permanent Court of Arbitration regarding the
               submissions of the Philippines) have established precedents for this.

               This is exactly where the dangers present themselves in the issue discussed above. Hungary
               has agreed to certain rules – the UN Refugee Convention and the Dublin process – but seeks
               to renege on these rules unilaterally without exiting the agreements. If Hungary is allowed to
               do so it creates a precedent that this is acceptable, which in turn will encourage other states to
               do so. Other Eastern European states, most prominently Poland, has already joined the path set
               by Hungary. This erodes the relevance of existing international law. To use a light-hearted
               example, the ‘pirate oath’ is a central theme of the first Pirates of the Caribbean movie. It is
               presented as the law governing pirate life until one of the characters breaks it with the argument
               that it is not as much an oath as a recommendation, depriving it from any pragmatic relevance
               as it is no longer a code to adhere to.  International law is the pirate code of international
               community and it is effective as long as everyone respects it.  However, it loses much of its
               effectiveness if it is allowed to degrade into a mere recommendation. Naturally one does not
               talk  about  the  immediate  implosion  of  all  international  law.  But  incidents  such  as  these
               represent a real risk of rot setting in the foundation of the international legal order. If they are
               not countered then over time the entire system risks collapse. It is with good reason that states
               that  are  non-compliant  with  international  law  are  labelled  as  rogue  states  and  vigorously
               opposed and punished by the community at large.




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