Page 56 - AEI Insights 2018 Vol 4 Issue 1
P. 56

AEI Insights, Vol 4, Issue 1, 2018


               examination of the conflict between international delegation and state sovereignty. (Hathaway,
               2008) She highlights that, while international treaties limit state sovereignty, the criticism of
               this trend often neglects to discuss the benefits of international cooperation such treaties make
               possible. Essentially, the argument is that states voluntarily accept some foreign interference
               in exchange for the benefits of international cooperation. Unfortunately, such a view is not
               represented  in  the  Government’s  approach  to  sovereignty  which  boils  down  to  the
               colloquialism of ‘my way or the highway’.

               One challenge for discussing this particular case is that much of the discussion focusing on the
               conflict between national sovereignty and what Kyl, Feith and Fonte (2013) describes as a
               ‘transnationalist challenge’ is concerned about entering into agreements. This is not the case in
               this  particular  scenario  as  Hungary  has  willingly  and  voluntarily  entered  the  agreements
               already with seemingly little concern of how they will affect its sovereignty, hence this case
               falls  beyond  the  limits  of  the  typical  discussion  on  U.S.  sovereignty  and  Washington’s
               unwillingness  to  enter into certain  international  agreements.  The  case of Hungary is  more
               reminiscent  of  the  trend  shown  by  Donohoe  (2013):  attitudes  towards  what  constitute
               acceptable  limits  on  sovereignty  change  over  time.  One  could  reason  that  such  trends  are
               motivated by waning and waxing optimism towards the utility of such arrangements, especially
               when the – sometimes unanticipated – costs of these arrangements materialize.

               In  the  particular  case  of  Hungary  one  would  be  hard-pressed  to  prove  that  Hungarian
               sovereignty  has  been  violated.  Rather,  the  issue  at  hand  concerns  Budapest  honouring  its
               international obligations. Hungary has voluntarily joined both the relevant UN Conventions
               and the European Union. As part of the process Hungary has been aware of the both the benefits
               and  the  obligations  associated  with  the  agreements.  The  current  refugee  crisis  is  not
               qualitatively different from issues covered by relevant UN conventions and the Dublin process,
               merely  differ  in  scale.  Thus,  Hungary’s  obligations  remain  the  same.  The  threatened  EU
               infringement process is not as much a coercive influence to force Hungary to do something
               new as an expression of Brussels expectation for Hungary to do something it has already agreed
               to. Focusing on the refugee issue prevailing international law is clear: The 1951 UN Refugee
               Convention and the 1967 UN Refugee Convention requires the European Union and Hungary
               to process asylum seekers. The Dublin Process established the method for this on a continent-
               wide scale and is binding to members of the European Union as it is a result of a common
               decision. Under the process Hungary is obliged to (a) process asylum seekers arriving into the
               country  and  (b)  comply  with  the  resettlement  of  refugees  across  Europe  or  monetarily
               contribute to exempt itself from that. This is not a matter of opinion, this a matter of existing
               international law.

               The argument that Hungarian sovereignty is under attack is further undermined by the fact that
               the Government has the sovereign authority to withdraw from all relevant agreements if it feels
               that the obligations imposed by these treaties no longer correspond to the country’s interests,
               assuming that that it can muster sufficient support for such a step in the Hungarian Parliament
               – in which the Government enjoys a majority. The BREXIT sought after by London creates a
               clear precedent that if a country no longer feels that EU membership is in its best interest, then
               there is a process to exit the Union. Hungary is free to pursue its own ‘HUXIT’, regardless of
               how terrible the acronym is. However, it is clear that the current FIDESZ Government shows
               little interest in an actual exit from the European Union, which would likely turn out to be a
               disaster for the country. EU membership has conferred significant benefits to Hungary and the
               Government is eager to preserve these. Furthermore, any such move would likely encounter




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