Page 11 - AEI Insights 2019 - Vol. 5, Issue 1
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Furuoka et al, 2019


               where β is a bargaining parameter that would measure the level of strength of insider in the
                      e
               firm,  n   is  expected  level  of  employment,  nt-1  is    the  level  of  employment  at  time  of  the
               negotiation. This employment formula indicates that some insiders who is currently working
               in the firm could lose their employment during an economic recession if β is less than one.
               More  importantly,  if  the  bargaining  parameter  is  less  than  unity,  the  monetary  shock  will
               disappear in the long-run. It means that a monetary shock would have a transitory impact on
               the employment. In this case, the unemployment rates would follow a stationary process. In
               the stationary process, the unemployment would have a mean-reversion tendency and in the
               unit root process, the unemployment rate would not reverse to its mean value.  In other words,
               a higher-than-normal unemployment rate would revert to an equilibrium level. However, if the
               bargaining parameter is equal to unity, a monetary shock would not disappear. In this case, the
               unemployment rates would follow a unit root process (Wang, 2009). Thus, the main point of
               this theoretical framework on the employment model is that the strength of the insider in the
               firm will determine the labour market dynamics. In other words, the insider power could be the
               main  element  which  determines  whether  unemployment  rate  would  follow  the  stationary
               process. It means that the unemployment rate could follow a unit root process if the bargaining
               parameter of the insider in the firm is equal to unity under the pure insider model. Otherwise,
                                                                          2
               the unemployment rate would follow the stationary process  . In this context, the theoretical
               model suggests that unemployment rates in Europe my follow a unit root process because of
               stronger insiders’ power while the unemployment rates in Asia may follow a stationary process
               due to the lack of strong insiders.

               Main characteristics of labour market in Europe

               There are five major characteristics of labour market in Europe. The first characteristic of
               European labour market is the strong employment protection. In the European labour market,
               employment protection mechanisms, such as unemployment insurance, is seen as a potential
               cause of persistently high unemployment rates. It has been argued that the strong existence of
               employment protection in the region can prevent the labour market from becoming flexible
               enough to absorb negative shocks in the labour market. In other words, strong employment
               protection  would  prevent  wage  levels  from  becoming  lower  enough  to  provide  job
               opportunities to unemployed workers during the economic crisis.

               The second characteristic of European labour market is the lack of flexibility. There is an on-
               going  debate  on  the  relationship  between  worker  protection  provided  by  labour  market
               institutions and the flexibility of labour market. This debate is known as the labour market
               flexibility debate. Some economists who believe in the importance of flexibility argue against
               employment protection. These neoclassical economists promote the importance of natural rates
               of unemployment, the efficiency wage theory and the job search theory to explain the market
               equilibrium of labour supply and demand. According to this school of thought, unemployment
               insurance can be seen as a “social wage” which contributes to high unemployment. This line
               of argument is promoted by some international organisations, such as the Organisation for
               Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
               Thus, this economic thought is also known as the OECD-IMF orthodoxy for the labour market.
               For example, the OECD has proposed the OECD Jobs Strategy for all its member countries.



               2  This paper’s theoretical foundation is based on the employment function  within the insider-outsider theory
               suggested by Blanchard and Summers (1986). More recently, Gustavsson and Österholm (2007) have provided
               empirical  evidence  to  indicate  a  distinctive  difference  between  unemployment  and  employment  hysteresis.
               According to them, empirical tests tend to produce mixed evidence for hysteresis in unemployment. By contrast,
               unit root tests are able to produce more consistent results to support hysteresis in employment.

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