Page 21 - AEI Insights 2018 Vol 4 Issue 1
P. 21

AEI Insights, Vol 4, Issue 1, 2018


               well for certain periods but today in wholesale crisis we struggle to latch on to any the European
               models of understanding which can answer the crisis being felt and that the economic and
               social crisis are essentially the causes for the disaffection and Euroscepticism. As other scholars
               have  noted:  “Somewhat  remarkably,  however,  integration  theories  have  not  put  too  much
               emphasis  on  the  implications  of  crises  and  exogenous  shocks…  and  the  crisis  would  be
               expected to be an obstacle rather than an opportunity for further integration” (Tosun et al 2014:
               199).

               European integration and more specifically European jurisdiction of responsibilities until the
               1990s did not extend to ‘core state powers’ (Gentschel & Jachtenfuchs 2016). Much of the
               responsibilities in the hands of Brussels were aspects of governance which interfered little with
               the important day to day matters of member states.  EU affairs played out in both the European
               domain as well as within the member states seemed quite innocuous with little interference
               with  member  state  political  priorities.    This  changed  with  the  Single  Market  (1992)  and
               especially with the Maastricht Treaty and new areas of sovereignty deficit for member states.
               This was most felt with the enormous step taken by the EU with the achievement of the single
               currency and the Economic and Monetary Union.

               As Brussels now emerged as a real facet of political direction so too would the concern about
               sovereignty of the nation states, and with growing levels of “Euroscepticism” also saw the end
               of  the  ‘permissive  consensus’  (Lindberg  &  Scheingold,  1970)  which  had  been  the  modus
               operandi give way to  ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2005). As this consensus
               was evolving a political disconnect also emerged. Bellamy and Kroger (2016) noted that rather
               than a democratic deficit in operation of the EU institutions, the concern was more of a political
               disconnect between the politics and institutions of national parliament and the those of the
               European Union (2016, p. 125).  Of equal concern and development was another feature of
               European integration or its lack of, was the notion of “differentiated integration”. Again EU
               scholars such as Bellamy and Kroger in another work recognised that not all states could move
               in the same direction at the same time – differentiated speed meant some do more while others
               do less.  In European integration code, this had another expression known as “Two speed” or
               even “Three speed” Europe.

               From the 1990s, despite moments of “honey moon” respite, the European project proceeded
               along a” two steps forward one step back” trajectory. A reunified Germany, a Maastricht Treaty
               and the Economic and Monetary Union while major milestones in the development of the
               European Project were also those that would differentiate between the member states bringing
               out the cracks in the union. These were the measures, which brought out the different Europe’s
               and their respective economic positioning. This included the southern Mediterranean flank. At
               the same time in different portions, certain features of the European Union played their divisive
               role. These included the concern over sovereignty, economic decline back in the member states
               and the rise of right wing concern over growing levels of inward migration. At the same time
               Germany’s assertiveness became more noticeable as  Germany’s financial  prowess  became
               discernible in the EUs monetary policy and approach towards economic management.

               The 2004 accession of the Central and Eastern European states was a daring leap into expansion
               of the European Union as it had never done. This growth to the east however also triggered
               strong reactions within the existing European community. As the EU moved towards a stronger
               governing framework, the proposed Constitution, it received aftershocks when the proposed
               constitution  was  voted  down  in  France  and  The  Netherlands.  It  was  a  warning  to  the  EU
               community that a step too far had been made and that backtracking was in order. Some level


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