Page 23 - AEI Insights 2018 Vol 4 Issue 1

AEI Insights, Vol 4, Issue 1, 2018

In the midst of the economic crisis, the European Union had unfinished business with the
failure of the Constitutional Convention and the attempt to modernise the EUs governance
system. The Lisbon Treaty talks, recommendations and conclusions offered some resolution
to the democratic deficit as well as a stronger executive system for the European Union. The
fragmented decision making structure of the European Union, exemplified by the divisions on
a range of issues including foreign policy, highlighted the EUs weaknesses. The 2009 Lisbon
Treaty ratification the member states provided greater levels of power to the European
Parliament, some response to new structures, firmer institutions and a firmer unified voice with
the establishment of the permanent presidency of the EU and the High representative for
Foreign Affairs. As an aside, the Lisbon Treaty also added without much discussion and debate
the possibility of an exit clause from the European Union, which had never been seriously
considered or expected. This would of course play a more prominent role with the British exit
referendum in June 2016.

The legitimacy of the EU institutions addressed in the Lisbon Treaty was also code for crisis
aversion and “democratic deficit” a much used association but poorly acted on. The intention
of the EU leadership was to seek through Lisbon Treaty a way to improve dialogue with the
populace in the EU in what was seemingly an already restless audience. While it is normal
to speak of crisis within the European Union, the first serious sounding of alarm occurred in
the middle of the global financial crisis. Scholars of European Integration first flagged:
“The European Union is currently experiencing its deepest crisis since it came into
existence. The euro is undergoing the acid test and threatens to pull the single market into
the abyss along with it. Collapse of the European Union, which due to successful integration
since 1987 had seemed scarcely possible, can no longer be ruled out” (Busch et al 2013: 3).

Though much of the world was easing away from the global financial crisis by 2012, the
southern European member states continued to go deeper into economic difficulties. Greece
had reached catastrophic proportions and bailout proposals were being prepared by the EU.
The situation would only deteriorate in the coming years with the final showdown with the
Greek Syriza government in 2015 with an imposed bailout package which shook the moral
foundations of Greece questioning not only its attitude towards the European Union but its
ability to sustain the bailout clauses. It was the 12 billion euro bailout that the Greek Prime
Minister initially recommended rejection through a hastily proposed referendum, which was
initially a whole sale rejection of the package and later and under duress reluctantly accepted.
It was an agreement Tsiparis said asking the Greek people to "abandon [their] dignity" (Reuter
2015). This crisis remains current to this moment.

The European Parliamentary Elections in 2014

Even before the European Parliamentary elections took place in May 2014, murmurs of
concern were alive in terms of the populist responses already emerging in member state
elections. Now it was the turn of the European Parliament. The 2014 European Parliamentary
(EP) elections was the largest of its kind with more than 12,000 candidates from almost 450
parties competing for 751 seats. This involved over 400 million voters from the then 28
member states (Treib 2014: 1541). Democracy within the European Union was already in
crisis on the back of the global financial crisis and already reflected in the results of elections
in numerous member states. As one commentator observed:
“… in the EU between 2007-2011 …we find strong evidence that the way the crisis has thus
far been handled politically (through the imposition of austerity policies from above and by

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