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Savelyev, 2021

States, and Russia. The proponents of this approach believe that this may provide an
approximately equitable basis for talks among the aforesaid states (Zhao, 2020).

All the aforementioned recommendations―and a number of other ideas―for plugging
China into bilateral or multilateral nuclear arms control talks are based on the past
experience of negotiations on the issue. In the meantime, the specifics of China’s nuclear
policy are left unnoticed or intentionally ignored. It is generally believed that inviting
China to participate in negotiations is tantamount to official recognition of its status as
a great power responsible, like the United States and Russia, not only for its own security
but also for global security. This recognition is often considered a reason enough to
expect China to consent to participate in such negotiations and the main problem is seen
in the formulation of concrete proposals for discussion. In the meantime, such an
approach looks erroneous.

The fundamental principles of China’s nuclear policy

China’s policy concerning nuclear arms and their role in maintaining national security
has remained unchanged for more than 55 years, starting from its accession to the
“nuclear club” in 1964. Central to that policy is China’s pledge not to be the first to use
nuclear weapons or threaten to use them against non-nuclear countries and countries in
nuclear free zones. It is believed that Mao Zedong made that decision personally in 1964
(Fravel, 2019).

In accordance with this pledge, China, as it reiterates, maintains its nuclear deterrence
weapons at a required minimum by declaring its readiness for retaliation against an
aggressor in the event of a hypothetical nuclear attack. China vows it does not participate
in a nuclear arms race against any country. These provisions have remained unchanged
for many years and can be found in many Chinese fundamental military and strategic
planning documents, available from open sources (The State Council, 2019), and are
repeatedly quoted by the Chinese mass media (Xinhuaneet.com., 2019).

In contrast to the classical nuclear deterrence formula China does not demonstrate its
retaliatory strike capabilities; on the contrary, it conceals them for various reasons.
Enhancing the survivability of retaliatory strike systems is one. Such “existential” means
of deterrence enables the country possessing a relatively small nuclear potential to keep
a potential aggressor in a state of strategic uncertainty as it cannot be certain that its first
strike would “disarm” the defending opponent by eliminating all of its nuclear weapons
with a surprise counterforce strike.

To confirm its adherence to the no-fist use principle, China declares that it limits its
nuclear potential to the “minimum” defense requirements, while all upgrade programs
are geared mostly to ensuring the survivability and reliability of retaliatory strike
systems. China’s nuclear forces have become more survivable due to the creation and
deployment of mobile ICBMs, and measures to shelter a considerable part of its nuclear
potential, including mobile ICBMs and shorter-range missiles in a network of
underground tunnels―the Underground Great Wall of China. Also, other means of
hiding nuclear weapons are used, such as mock ICBM silos and shelters for nuclear
submarines inside coastal rocks.

As the information about the condition, development prospects and size of China’s
nuclear potential remains scarce, its nuclear policy issues are in the focus of attention of
many specialists and think tanks in the United States and other countries. Most of them
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