Page 15 - AEI Insights Vol. 7 2021
P. 15

Savelyev, 2021



               As far as Russia is concerned, its current policy of avoiding pressure on China to make it
               engage in nuclear arms talks looks reasonable. From the political standpoint―alongside with
               other considerations―a trilateral agreement would mean that Russia officially regards China,
               albeit formally, as a “partner” (if not a “potential adversary”), just as the United States, and
               that strategic relations among such parties are based on the concept of nuclear deterrence, the
               balance of nuclear forces, and their capabilities to deliver  first and retaliatory strikes.
               Incidentally, China’s participation would have the same implications for Russia. Lending this
               dimension to bilateral relations hardly meets the interests of the two countries.



               References
               Adamczyk, E., 2019. “China Will Double Its Nuclear Warheads in Next 10 Years,” DIA
                 Chief Says. Defense News, 31 May 31[online]. Available at:
                 <https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2019/05/31/China-will-double-its-nuclear-
                 warheads-in-next-10-years-DIA-chief-says/1621559319133/> [Accessed 11 May 2020].

               Bajrektarevic, A., 2020 “The post-Corona epilogue of Sino-American relationship”
                 http://www.diplomatmagazine.eu/2020/05/03/the-post-corona-epilogue-of-an-overheated-
                 sino-american-relationship-we-have-a-winner-will-we-have-a-game-changer-too/

               ECNC, 2020. “China Will Not Join So-Called China-U.S.-Russia Arms Control
                 Negotiations”. ECNC.cn [online]. Available at: <http://www.ecns.cn/news/politics/2020-
                 03-06/detail-ifzuhesu4122041.shtml> [Accessed 20 March 2020].

               Fact Sheet China, 2004. Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of. Ministry of Foreign
                 Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Fact Sheet China, 27 April.

               Ford, C., 2020. US Priorities for “Next Generation Arms Control”. US Department of State.
                 Arms Control and International Security Papers, 1(1), o6 April, p. 4.
               Fravel, M., 2019. China Has Not (Yet) Changed Its Position on Nuclear Weapons. The
                 Diplomat, 22 April [online]. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2013/04/china-has-
                 not-yet-changed-its-position-on-nuclear-weapons/> [Accessed 5 May 2020].
               Gertz, B., 2020. Envoy Says China Is Key to New Arms Deal with Russia. The Washington
                 Times, 7 May [online]. Available at:
                 <https://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/may/7/marshall-billingslea-says-new-start-
                 fate-hangs-chi/> [Accessed May 10, 2020].

               Giacometti, N., 2014. For Half a Century, China’s Nuclear Strategy Has Been Surprisingly
                 Consistent. Will It Remain So? The Diplomat, 16 October [online]. Available at:

               <https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/could-chinas-nuclear-strategy-evolve/> [Accessed 5 May
                 2020]
               Karber, Ph. A., 2011. Strategic Implications of China’s Underground Great Wall.
                 Federation of American Scientists, 11 September [pdf]. Available at:
                 <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Karber_UndergroundFacilities-Full_2011_reduced.pdf>
                 [Accessed June 22, 2020]

               Kristensen, H. and Korda, M., 2020. Status of World Nuclear Forces. Federation of
                 American Scientists [online]. Available at: <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-
                 world-nuclear-forces/> [Accessed 10 August 2020].


                                                             15
   10   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20