Page 14 - AEI Insights Vol. 7 2021

AEI Insights, Vol 7, Issue 1, 2021

to enter into such negotiations (it says so openly) is further reduction of nuclear arsenals by
Russia and the United States to levels comparable with China’s potential. As it has been
already stated, this condition, described as a political one, has fundamental strategic, military
and technical grounds.

Likely consequences of China’s participation in a nuclear arms control treaty

As has been said above, China’s consent to enter into nuclear arms control negotiations and
conclusion of a corresponding agreement will be unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, it is worth pondering on what decisions in the military and political field the
Chinese leadership may adopt if it has to give in to U.S. pressure. One of the most important
decisions is, to my mind, the possibility of China remaining committed to the no-first-use
principle.

Currently, this principle is ensured not so much by the quantitative parameters of China’s
nuclear arsenal, but as its stealthy deployment, concealment measures, and refusal to provide
relevant information. In order to retain a retaliatory strike potential in a situation where the
information about the deployment sites of China’s nuclear forces has been disclosed while the
amount of nuclear arms available remains considerably inferior to those of the “partner” or
“partners,” China will have to exert major efforts to ensure the invulnerability of at least some
of them. Doing this will be impossible without a major buildup of the nuclear potential, above
all, of the least vulnerable strategic systems (mobile ICBMs and SLBMs). All of this will
require considerable expenses and time. Even if the work on a new treaty takes two or three,
or even five years, one can hardly expect any considerable changes in the quantitative and
qualitative structure of China’s nuclear forces by the moment this work is finalized.
The problem of strategic nuclear forces’ vulnerability may theoretically be resolved (at least
to a certain extent) by developing and deploying missile defenses around deployment sites.
But this would entail heavy spending, too. Also, such a program can hardly be implemented
within tight deadlines. The problem of greater vulnerability of China’s strategic nuclear forces
can also be resolved by adopting the “launch-under-attack” concept or “launch on warning”
concept. Their adoption might be considered, although with great reservations, to conform to
the no-first-use principle, but in this case it will be essential to build a warning system based
on early warning satellites and radars. However, still there will be no guarantees that such a
system will be able to issue a timely notification to the military and political leadership of a
missile attack against China, if such a strike is carried out with U.S. SLBMs having short
flight-in time and counterforce capability. Under such a scenario China’s strategic forces will
have to remain on high alert all the time. This means that China will be forced to give up
keeping missile warheads in store separately and to deploy them on strategic delivery vehicles,
thus demonstrating its readiness for instant retaliation in case of an attack warning.
The above arguments prompt the conclusion that China, if it agrees to the drafting and signing
a nuclear arms control treaty, will certainly have to depart from the principle of no-first-use
of nuclear weapons, with all the ensuing negative consequences. This may also trigger an
enhanced arms race and induce China to adopt more aggressive nuclear arms concepts.

China finds it far easier to refuse to hold nuclear arms control talks than address the adverse
military and strategic effects its participation in such an international agreement is bound to
entail. In this situation the United States should give more thought to its policy of engaging
China in nuclear arms control talks and focus on Russian-U.S. strategic relations, including
the prolongation of the New START without any linkages and preconditions.
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