Page 13 - AEI Insights Vol. 7 2021

Savelyev, 2021

A total ban was applied to ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range cruise missiles.
An attempt was made to outlaw ICBMs with multiple warheads. Each clause of the
concluded treaties was scrutinized by the expert community and drew worldwide
interest.
In addition, efforts were made to develop a mechanism to verify compliance with the
assumed commitments. The first Soviet-U.S. agreements SALT-1 (1972) and SALT-2
(1979) assigned the control function to “national technical means of
verification”―intelligence satellites. The contracting parties pledged to refrain from
creating impediments to their operation. Also, the signatories undertook “not to use
deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of
compliance.” In the next agreements―the INF Treaty (of 1987) and, particularly, START-1
(1991) ― a comprehensive system of control and verification was developed and adopted. It
envisaged exchanges of data (including the geographical coordinates of each ICBM silo) and
various notifications and on-site inspections, which made it totally impossible to conceal even
the slightest violations of these agreements. This system of verification functions within the
framework of the still effective Russian-U.S. New START, concluded in 2010.

It is hard to imagine a hypothetical agreement with China not including compliance
verification procedures. And it is very unlikely that the system of verification in such an
agreement will be “soft,” as was the case with the one established under the earlier SALT-1
and SALT-2 treaties. On the contrary, as follows from statements by U.S. officials, the United
States is determined to pay the closest attention to the verification and control of compliance
with all future agreements. U.S. Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Christopher Ford has made an explicit statement on this score.

Even if such an agreement does not impose any obligations on China, requiring reduction of
its nuclear potential, Beijing will be expected to provide exhaustive information about its
nuclear weapons and deployment sites. Also, China will have to give up measures to conceal
its nuclear forces, change the locations of mobile missile systems and allow foreign inspectors
to visit classified facilities (including the Underground Great Wall of China) in order to
confirm that the provided information is correct and proper action has been taken under
assumed commitments. Besides, China will have to notify other signatories of the
commissioning of new nuclear weapons and withdrawal from operational duty or elimination
of older systems, the redeployment of weapons, etc. All these measures will make it possible
to keep under full control China’s nuclear potential and nuclear arms delivery vehicles.

These measures, understandable from the standpoint of an arms control treaty, may have truly
disastrous effects on China’s entire official nuclear policy. Information disclosure and control
measures would make China’s nuclear arsenal totally vulnerable to a first nuclear strike and
partially – to a non-nuclear strike. A potential aggressor, possessing a considerable advantage
in nuclear weapons and full information about the deployment sites, will have a guaranteed
capability to destroy the adversary’s entire nuclear potential. Theoretically, it would spend far
more nuclear weapons than the victim of the aggression (in this particular case, China) would
lose, but still retain an enormous attack potential. In a situation like this, there will be no
weapons available to deliver a retaliatory strike. All this will mean that China’s declared no-
first-use policy will lose credibility. In other words, it will turn into a propaganda slogan, with
no real resources to rely on to implement this policy in practice.
Apparently, it is precisely these considerations that are behind China’s refusal to participate
in nuclear arms control talks, and they will remain in place at least until the strategic situation
in this field undergoes fundamental change. One of the most important conditions for China
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