Page 12 - AEI Insights Vol. 7 2021

AEI Insights, Vol 7, Issue 1, 2021

(but far from all) believe that China’s declared policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons
and estimates of its nuclear potential (around 300 warheads) agree with reality (Pifer,
2019). But other researchers maintain that under certain circumstances China may revise
its attitude to the no-first-use principle and abandon the minimum deterrence concept in
favor of gaining opportunities for conducting limited nuclear war. Such conclusions are
made on the basis of data showing the growth of qualitative parameters of China’s
nuclear forces―greater accuracy of nuclear warheads, the deployment of MIRVs on
ICBMs, forecasts for a considerable increase in the overall number of nuclear weapons
at the country’s disposal, etc. (Giacomdetti, 2014; Yoshihara and Bianchi, 2019;
Schneider, 2019).

It should be acknowledged that the lack of official information about the condition and
development prospects of China’s nuclear arsenal and implementation of programs in
the strategic field (creation of a heavy ICBM, research and development of a missile
attack warning system, deployment of a missile defense, and others) afford ground for a
variety of speculations over China’s compliance with the professed principles regarding
nuclear weapons. In the meantime, this by no means contradicts the fundamental
principle of China’s nuclear policy―no-first-use of nuclear weapons―which will
remain unchanged in the foreseeable future. Even if one assumes that China does
participate in the nuclear arms race (which is also a subject of speculations), it is by no
means its instigator.

Certain changes are possible, though. China may acquire real capabilities for a limited
response to a limited nuclear attack. In other words, the country’s military-political
leadership, empowered to make a decision to use nuclear weapons, will acquire extra
opportunities and options for retaliation other than a massive nuclear strike against the
enemy’s major unprotected targets, such as cities and industrial centers. At the same
time there is no reason to say that the improvement of parameters of China’s strategic
nuclear forces increases the risk of a first counterforce strike against a would-be
aggressor just because the nuclear potentials of China and the two leading nuclear
powers are incomparable. In this case size does matter.

Effects of arms control on China’s nuclear strategy and policy
Should China agree to participate in negotiations or draft an agreement on control of its
nuclear weapons, its nuclear strategy and policy will most likely undergo the most
serious changes. And these changes, in the author’s opinion, may be far from positive.
They will result not from possible restrictions imposed on China’s nuclear forces or
disadvantageous terms of a future treaty forced upon China, but the very fact of
concluding such an international treaty.
A close look at Soviet-U.S. and Russian-U.S. nuclear arms control agreements reveals
how the parties’ approaches to solving the problems of national security and
strengthening strategic stability have been changing. At early stages the two sides
managed to come to terms regarding the overall number of ground-based launchers of
strategic ballistic missiles, SLBM capable submarines and SLBM launchers. Later, the
class of strategic weapons was expanded to incorporate heavy bombers armed with long-
range cruise missiles and gravity nuclear bombs. Some types of nuclear weapons, for
instance, strategic air-launched ballistic missiles were banned. Next, there followed
restrictions on nuclear warheads deployed on delivery vehicles and then their reductions.

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